Abstract. Masking is a well-known technique used to prevent block cipher implementations from side-channel attacks. Higher-order side channel attacks (e.g. higher-order DPA attack) on widely used block cipher like AES have motivated the design of ecient higher-order masking schemes. Indeed, it is known that as the masking order increases, the diculty of side-channel attack increases exponentially. However, the main problem in higher-order masking is to design an ecient and secure technique for S-box computations in block cipher implementations. At FSE 2012, Carlet et al. proposed a generic masking scheme that can be applied to any S-box at any order. This is the rst generic scheme for ecient software implementations. Analysis of the running time, or masking complexity, of this scheme is related to a variant of the well-known problem of ecient exponentiation (addition chain ), and evaluation of polynomials. In this paper we investigate optimal methods for exponentiation in F2n by studying a variant of addition chain, which we call cyclotomic-class addition chain, or CC-addition chain. Among several interesting properties, we prove lower bounds on min-length CC-addition chains. We dene the notion of F2n -polynomial chain, and use it to count the number of non-linear multiplications required while evaluating polynomials over F2n . We also give a lower bound on the length of such a chain for any polynomial. As a consequence, we show that a lower bound for the masking complexity of DES S-boxes is three, and that of PRESENT S-box is two. We disprove a claim previously made by Carlet et al. regarding min-length CC-addition chains. Finally, we give a polynomial evaluation method, which results into an improved masking scheme (compared to the technique of Carlet et al.) for DES S-boxes. As an illustration we apply this method to several other S-boxes and show signicant improvement for them.
Introduction
Side-channel attacks are considered to be an important class of cryptanalysis techniques in modern cryptography. These attacks exploit various types of physThis paper has been accepted for publication at CHES 2013. This is the full version.
ical leakage of information including power consumption, running time, electromagnetic emission etc. during the execution of cryptographic algorithm on a target device [11] . In practice they are often more successful than the black-box cryptanalysis, and many such practical attacks were demonstrated against wellknown ciphers. Hence it is a natural concern to protect a cryptosystem against these attacks.
Masking is a widely used technique to protect block cipher implementations from side-channel attacks. Goubin and Patarin proposed one such scheme for DES [7] . Many other techniques for both hardware and software implementation were later proposed, especially for AES (see [4] and references therein). Most of these schemes have masking order one and, as a result, they are only resilient against rst-order side-channel attacks. However in the past years, higher-order side-channel attacks have been proposed against well-known ciphers like AES.
Motivated by these attacks, several higher-order masking schemes have been proposed.
In a higher-order masking scheme each sensitive variable (e.g. variables involving secret keys) is randomly split into d + 1 shares, where d is known as the masking order. Chari et al. [5] showed that the complexity of side-channel attacks increases exponentially with the masking order. However implementing a higher-order masking scheme will also aect the performance of the cryptographic algorithm. Hence an algorithm resilient to higher-order attacks aims at designing ecient masking techniques for block ciphers.
Higher-Order Masking: Although many masking techniques have been proposed in literature, there are only a few that deal with higher-order masking.
Schramm and Paar [18] generalized the rst-order table recomputation method given in [1, 12] . Their method can be applied to protect any S-box, but a thirdorder attack was shown against this scheme by Coron et al. [6] . Rivain et al.
also proposed a scheme with formal security proofs but their method only gives second-order security [15] . Ishai et al. [8] provided the rst dth-order masking method that can be applied to any S-box, for arbitrary d. However, applying this technique for masking S-boxes in software becomes inecient. Rivain and Prou [16] presented an ecient technique for masking AES S-box for any order.
Further Kim et al. [9] extended this scheme based on an approach of [17] . In FSE 2012, Carlet et al. [4] presented the rst generic dth-order masking scheme, suitable for software implementation, that can be applied to any S-box. Currently, this is the only such generic scheme.
Masking, Polynomial Evaluation, and Addition Chains An (n, m)-S-box is a function from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} m , where m ≤ n. there are also studies on the suitability of S-boxes based on power functions [13] . Formal analysis of the optimal methods to evaluate these powers has led to a detailed study of addition chains [21, 10, Section 4.6.3] . The length of these chains correspond to the number of multiplications needed for the corresponding
exponentiation. However, to analyze the number of non-linear multiplications required to evaluate an S-box, we need to investigate a variant of addition chain introduced in [4] . We call this variant as cyclotomic-class addition chain, or in short, CC-addition chain to distinguish it from the usual addition chain. Also, CC-addition chains more accurately model the cost of exponentiations in F 2 n . This is because squaring is very ecient in F 2 n , and we can also use the relation x 2 n = x to our advantage.
Our Results
In this article we analyze and improve the generic higher order masking scheme proposed by Carlet et al. at FSE 2012 [4] . We start by establishing several interesting properties of CC-addition chain. We prove a lower bound on the minlength CC-addition chain of any integer, which turns out to be logarithmic in the Hamming weight of the integer. As a consequence, we disprove the claim in [4, pp. 373] saying that integers of the form 2 n − 2 have the longest min-length CCaddition chain than any other lesser number. We give an elegant mathematical proof showing that the masking complexity of AES is at least four, which was previously established by the brute-force method in [4] . We also give a result on the monotonicity property of the min-length CC-additions of an integer.
We propose and dene the notion of F 2 n -polynomial chain. Although the notion of CC-addition chain helps to evaluate the masking complexity of power functions, in case of general polynomials the idea of F 2 n -polynomial is more natural and useful. Such a notion is necessary to formally dene and establish lower bounds on the masking complexity of an S-box. We prove a lower bound on the minimum number of non-linear multiplications required to evaluate a polynomial in F 2 n . This lower bound is related to the min-length CC-addition chains of the integers present in the exponents of the polynomial. As a corollary we show that the masking complexity of DES (S-box) is at least three and that of PRESENT is at least two. Previously no such lower bounds were known. We prove that the notion of masking complexity is invariant of the way of representing the corresponding eld. One can argue that the linearity of the eld isomorphism reasoning given in [4] is incomplete.
Finally, we give a polynomial evaluation technique which improves the eciency of generic higher-order masking of S-boxes. For DES this algorithm gives improvement over the previously proposed algorithm in [4] and automatically improves the upper bound on the masking complexity of DES S-boxes to 7, from 10. We apply this technique to other well-known ciphers to demonstrate the eciency of this technique (c.f. 
such that for every i = 1, 2, . . . , r, there exist some 0 ≤ j, k < i such that
The length of S, denoted by L (S), is r.
Thus in an addition chain, any element in the sequence (except the rst) must be a sum of some previous two elements. The length of a shortest addition chain for α is denoted by l(α). Formally, l(α) = min {L (S) : S is an addition chain for α} .
Intuitively, l(α) represents the minimum number of multiplications needed to compute x α from x (x is an element of a monoid). The notion of addition chain has been generalized to q-addition chain (q ∈ N) in [20] . In this generalization of the usual addition chains the multiple of an element by q can be computed in a single step. Note that an (usual) addition chain is a 2-addition chain.
The q-addition chains are more relevant than (2-)addition chains in the case of exponentiations in nite elds F q n of characteristic q = 2. In such a eld it is possible to compute x q very eciently, often free [20] .
In this work we study another variant of addition chain introduced in [4] .
Before we describe the variant, let us rst see the following denition. Denition 2. [Cyclotomic Class [4] ] Let n ∈ N and α ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2 n − 2}. The cyclotomic class of α (w.r.t. n), denoted by C α , is dened as
The intuition for introducing the above denition comes from the following scenario. Let g be a generator of the multiplicative group F
It is easy to see that the relation R on set {0, 1, . . . , 2 n − 2}, dened as (α, β) ∈ R i β ∈ C α , is an equivalence relation. Hence the collection of cyclotomic classes forms a partition of the set {0, 1, . . . , 2 n − 2}. Since |C α | ≤ n, we obtain the following observation.
Remark 1. The number of cyclotomic classes w.r.t. n is at least
In [4] , the exact count of the number of cyclotomic classes (w.r.t. n) is given as
, where φ is the Euler's totient function and µ(δ) is the multiplicative order of 2 modulo δ. However, no lower bound on this expression was given there.
The simple observation in Remark 1 shows that δ|(2 n −1)
A variant of addition chain proposed in [4] is the cyclotomic-class addition chain, in short, CC-addition chain.
n − 2}, and
n − 2} be the collection of cyclotomic classes w.r.t. n, A cyclotomic-class addition chain S C of α (w.r.t. n) is a sequence of cyclotomic classes
such that for every i = 1, 2, . . . , r, there exist some 0 ≤ j, k < i, β i ∈ C ai , β j ∈ C aj , and β k ∈ C a k such that
The length of S C , denoted by LC n (S C ), is r.
Formally, a shortest CC-addition chain for α (w.r.t. n), denoted by m n (α), is dened as
The phrase masking complexity of α has been used in [4] to describe m n (α). CC-addition chains describe a way to compute x α from x ∈ F × 2 n , where squaring operations are considered free and hence not counted. These sort of chains model the complexity of exponentiation in F 2 n more accurately than (2-)addition chains when squaring is implemented very eciently using a special representation of eld elements [20] . CC-addition chains also model exactly the number of nonlinear multiplications required to mask S-boxes that are represented by power functions [4] . An important dierence between q-addition chains, in particular 2-addition chains, and CC-addition chains is that the former is a sequence of positive integers while the latter is a sequence of classes. It is for this reason that we refer to the latter chain as cyclotomic-class addition chain and not just 2-addition chain as done in [4] . The notion of CC-addition chains can be extended in a natural way to F q n to obtain q-CC-addition chain, analogous to q-addition chain. Accordingly, the CC-addition chain in Denition 3 may also be referred to as 2-CC-addition chain. In this work, we restrict ourselves to (2-)CC-addition chains, particularly keeping applications to higher-order masking in mind.
Note that m n (α) is not necessarily equal to the minimum number of nondoubling steps in all of addition chains for α, though m n (α) ≤ l(α). That is, every CC-addition chain does not necessarily need to be derived from an addition chain by not explicitly writing the doubling steps. This is a consequence of the fact that there exist α, n 1 and n 2 such that m n1 (α) = m n2 (α). For example, m 5 (23) = 2 but m 6 (23) = 3. We refer to the table of values for m n (α) for n ≤ 11
Nevertheless, we can obtain upper bounds on the value of m n (α) using previous results on addition chains in a straightforward way. Note that for a given value of α, m n (α) is dened only for those n such that α ≤ 2 n − 2. Hence we require n ≥ log 2 (α + 2) .
Upper bound for m n (α) A trivial upper bound m n (α) ≤ ν(α)−1 is obtained from the binary method [10, Section 4.6.3] . Let α = b t 2
where t = log 2 α , b i ∈ {0, 1} ∀i = 1, . . . , t, and b t = 1. An addition chain obtained from the binary method is as follows
The above addition chain yields a CC-addition chain for α (w.r.t. any n ≥ log 2 (α + 2) ). Hence the length of such a chain is ν(α) − 1. Note that we count only those additions that are not doublings.
An improved upper bound for m n (α) is possible if we use the techniques of Brauer [3] . In [3] , addition chains much shorter than those from the binary method have been constructed. This result on (2-)addition chains has also been extended to q-addition chains in [20] . See also [22,10, Section 4.6.3].
Brauer's method of constructing addition chains is a generalization of the binary method mentioned above. Instead of working in the base-2 expansion of α, we now work with base-2
. . , t, and b t = 0. The corresponding addition chain is 1, 2, . . . , z − 2, z − 1,
The total length of the above addition chain is z − 2 + t(k + 1). The number of non-doubling steps is (z − 2)/2 + t = 2
, which is also the length of the corresponding CC-addition chain for α (w.r.t. any n). This value is minimized when k ≈ log 2 log 2 α − 2 log 2 log 2 log 2 α and the corresponding value is about log 2 α log 2 log 2 α−2 log 2 log 2 log 2 α + (1)) .
Lower bound
No non-trivial lower bounds have been previously known for m n (α). In this article we show that m n (α) ≥ log 2 (ν(α)) . Recall that ν(α) is the Hamming weight of α in the binary notation. The basic idea is to rst show that Hamming weight is invariant in a cyclotomic class. To obtain the bound, we then use this result along with the simple fact that when two positive integers are added, then the Hamming weight of sum is at most the sum of the Hamming weights. Similar techniques have been used in [20] .
Lemma 1. Let n ∈ N, α ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2 n − 2}, and C α be the cyclotomic class
Proof. This follows from a well-known observation that the multiplication of α by 2 modulo 2 n − 1 is same as the cyclic left shift of the n-bit binary representation of α.
As an illustration, consider the cyclotomic class C 3 of α = 3 w.r.t. n = 5. C 3 = {3, 6, 12, 24, 17}. Note that 17·2 ≡ 3 (mod 31). In the binary representation,
The following proposition gives a lower bound for m n (α).
Proof. From Lemma 1 and, the fact that the Hamming weight of sum of two positive integers is at most the sum of the Hamming weights, we obtain that the CC-addition chain of length at most r (3) can only contain integers having Hamming weight at most 2 r . This is because elements of C 1 have Hamming weight 1 and at each step the Hamming weight can at most double. Therefore, in order for α to be present in a CC-addition chain, then the chain's length must be at least log 2 (ν(α)) .
As a consequence of the above proposition, we now disprove the claim made in [4, pp. 373] . Their claim was that given a (xed) value of n, m n (2 n − 2) ≥ m n (α) ∀α = 1, . . . , 2 n − 3, i.e., 2 n − 2 has the longest min-length CC-addition chain among the integers modulo 2 n − 1.
Proposition 2. Let n = 2 t + 1 for some t ∈ N and t > 2. Then m n (2 n − 2) = t.
In particular, m 9 (510) = 3 < m 9 (508) = 4. Proof. In Appendix A.
Monotonicity of m n (α)
It is natural to ask how the value of m n (α) varies with n. As mentioned previously, m n (α) is dened only for n ≥ log 2 (α + 2) . Is the value of m n (α) independent of n for a given value of α? This is not true since we have already seen the counterexample m 5 (23) = 2 but m 6 (23) = 3. The example m 7 (83) = 3 but m 9 (83) = 2 shows that m n (α) can also decrease as n increases. We can generalize the above examples to obtain innitely many ex- But we can still show that m n (α) ≤ m n (α) if n | n , i.e. if n divides n . Theorem 1. Let α, n, n ∈ N, n | n and log 2 (α + 2) ≤ n ≤ n . Then m n (α) ≤ m n (α) .
Proof. In Appendix B.
Theorem 1 suggests that, to nd a minimum length CC-addition chain w.r.t.
n , rst try to nd one w.r.t. a divisor n of n . Since F 2 n is a smaller eld than F 2 n , it may be advantageous to work in F 2 n . Once a minimum length CCaddition chain w.r.t. n is found, then check if it is a CC-addition chain w.r.t. n . If it is the case, then it will be a minimum length chain. Denition 4. A F 2 n -polynomial chain S for a polynomial P (x) ∈ F 2 n [x] is dened as
where
Note that here · and both perform the same operation, multiplication in F 2 n . However in order to dierentiate the non-linear operation we use for scalar multiplication. Here λ j · λ k denotes a non-linear multiplication. Let the number of non-linear multiplications involved in chain S be N (S). Then the non-linear complexity of P (x) (over F 2 n ), denoted by M(P (x)), is dened as M(P (x)) = min S N (S), where S computes P (x).
Proposition 3. Let
Proof. To prove the proposition, we just need to prove the following claim. Let Well-denedness The well-denedness and relevance of the above denition of masking complexity is guranteed because of the following reasons.
1. A natural question is -does masking complexity change with the irreducible polynomial used to represent F 2 n ? Note that under the natural mapping of bit strings to the eld elements, the same S-box may correspond to dierent polynomials over F 2 n for dierent representations of the eld. However we show in Theorem 2 that masking complexity does not depend on the eld representation.
2. It is relatively straightforward to mask ane functions. In F 2 n , squaring is linear, and ane functions are free from any non-linear multiplications.
The n-bit strings can be naturally mapped to eld elements of F 2 n represented as polynomials over F 2 modulo a degree n irreducible polynomial f 1 (y).
where b i ∈ {0, 1}. The m-bit strings (m ≤ n) are appended with leading zeros to identify them with n-bit strings. Later we shall see that it suces if B 1 is some F 2 -linear bijection. Note that ({0, 1} n , ⊕) may be viewed as a vector space over
Remark 2. It was claimed in [4, Remark 3] that the property of independence of masking complexity w.r.t. the irreducible polynomial used to represent F 2 n follows from the fact that eld isomorphisms are F 2 -linear bijections. This reason is not enough and a formal proof requires more arguments, as we shall see in the proof of Theorem 2.
Let f 1 (y) and f 2 (z) be two irreducible polynomials of degree n over F 2 . Then (8) Let U : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be any function on n-bit strings. For instance, U may represent an (n, m)-S-box (upon padding m-bit strings with leading zeros).
The maps U and B 1 will induce a map U 1 :
Similarly we can dene
Let P 1 (x) and P 2 (x) be the polynomial representations (of degree at most 2 n −1)
of U 1 and U 2 , respectively. We now prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. M (P 1 (x)) = M (P 2 (x)), where P 1 (x) and P 2 (x) are as dened above. In other words, the masking complexity of an S-box (in general, any function on bit strings) is invariant w.r.t. eld representations.
Proof. In Appendix C.
Lemma 2. [4, Proposition 1] The masking complexity of an S-box (in general, any function) cannot increase when it is composed with ane functions. When composed with ane bijections, then masking complexity remains the same.
Remark 3. Note that Lemma 2 holds only when the evaluation of ane functions over F 2 n does not involve any non-linear multiplication. For the sake of completeness, this property is proved in Lemma 6.
Note that in the proof of Theorem 2 the only property of the maps B 1 and B 2 used is that they are F 2 -linear bijections. Hence if B 1 and B 2 are any linear bijections, even then the masking complexity of an S-box remains invariant.
Lower Bounds
respectively. From Theorem 2, we know that the masking complexity is invariant w.r.t. the eld representations.
The polynomials corresponding to eight DES S-boxes are polynomials of
, and the one for the PRESENT S-box is a polynomial of
. Since m 6 (62) = 3 and m 4 (14) = 2, from Proposition 3 we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Masking complexity of a DES S-box is at least 3, and that of the PRESENT S-box is at least 2.
The AES S-box can be written as an ane permutation composed with the
. From Lemma 2, the masking complexity of AES Sbox is M x 254 over F 2 8 . Using arguments similar to the proof of Lemma 4 (in Appendix A), we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Masking complexity of the AES S-box is at least 4.
The above corollary was shown by exhaustive search in [4] .
Improved Generic Higher-Order Masking of S-boxes
In [4] , Carlet et al. used the cyclotomic class method to get a masking scheme for S-boxes. They also gave parity-split method to evaluate polynomials eciently.
In this section we apply a divide-and-conquer method to obtain an ecient solution to the same problem. The main idea of this approach is to express the polynomial(say, having degree N ) as a function of several lower degree polynomials, each of degree at most k (for some xed k). Let P (x) be the polynomial of degree N which we want to evaluate. Then we start by dividing the polynomial with x kt where N = k(2t − 1). The remainder obtained by this will have degree at most kt−1 and degree of the quotient will be kt − t = k(t − 1). Next we can add the term x k(t−1) to the remainder and divide the sum by the quotient. This allows us to express the remainder by polynomials having degree at most k − 1 and k(t − 1) − 1. Now the term x k(t−1) together with the other lower degree polynomials will allow us to apply the method recursively when t = 2 l .
In [14] this divide-and-conquer approach for monic polynomials is proposed.
For the sake of completeness, a brief description of this general method is given in the Appendix D. However, we observe that in our case the restriction of polynomial being monic is not necessary. Also it turns out that we can adapt that algorithm even if the condition N = k(2t − 1) is not satised. We describe this with specic examples of DES, AES and some other well-known S-boxes.
DES S-boxes
Let P DES (x) be the polynomial in F 2 6 [x] corresponding to an S-box of DES.
Note that for all the S-boxes the corresponding polynomial has degree 62. We
where deg(R) ≤ 35 and deg(q) = 26. Now if we divide the polynomial R(x) − x 27 with q(x), we get c(x) and s(x) satisfying
where deg(c) ≤ 9 and deg(s) ≤ 25. Substituting (12) in (11), we get
Further continuing in the same way we rst divide q(x) with x
18 to obtain
and then divide R 1 (x) − x 9 by q 1 (x) to obtain
Combining (14) and (15) we get
Where deg(R 1 ) ≤ 17, deg(q 1 ) = 8, deg(c 1 ) ≤ 9 and deg(s 1 ) ≤ 7. Similarly proceeding with x 27 + s(x), we get q 2 (x), R 2 (x), c 2 (x), and s 2 (x) satisfying
where deg(R 2 ) ≤ 17, deg(q 2 ) = 9, deg(c 2 ) ≤ 8 and deg(s 2 ) ≤ 8. Combining them we get
Finally combining equations (18), (16) and (13), we obtain
In ( 
Given the initially computed list of powers, the above computation can be done with three non-linear multiplications. So four non-linear multiplications are required all together for the AES S-box, which is exactly equal to its masking complexity. The cyclotomic method of [4] also achieves the optimal number.
PRESENT and SERPENT S-boxes
We have also considered the application of above techniques to 4-bit S-boxes of PRESENT and SERPENT ciphers. PRESENT cipher has a single S-box, whose corresponding polynomial over F (for one). In all the cases we require 3 non-linear multiplications. The cyclotomic method also requires the same number.
An outline of the method is as follows. Initially compute the list x, x 2 , 
Cost of linear operations
The technique presented in this section to evaluate the polynomials corresponding to specic S-boxes has lead to an improvement (or remain the same) in the number of non-linear multiplications required. We would like to note that this method does not incur signicant overhead with respect to the linear operations. For instance, in the case of DES S-boxes, we need about 63 additions, 58 scalar multiplications, and 6 squarings. Both the cyclotomic method as well as the parity-split method of [4] require about 62 additions and 62 scalar multiplications. The number of squarings for the cyclotomic method is about 50, and it is about 7 for the parity-split method.
An estimate in general for the two methods of [4] is as follows. The number of additions required by both the methods is equal to the number of terms in the polynomial less one, while the number of scalar multiplications is the number of non-monic coecients less one (for the constant term). 
Conclusion
In this work we have formalized the idea of polynomial chain in F 2 n . Using this notion we give bounds on the masking complexity of polynomials corresponding to several S-boxes. The idea of polynomial chain is more generic (in the context of polynomial evaluation). This gives a better way of analyzing the masking complexity for S-boxes which do not correspond to some power function, as is the case for many S-boxes used in popular block ciphers. The polynomial evaluation method described in Section 4 results into more ecient generic higherorder masking scheme for many S-boxes, compared to the algorithms/heuristics provided in [4] . Also our analysis gives insight into the polynomial evaluation methods in F 2 n , which could be of independent interest.
